Virtue epistemology (VE) suggests that S knows just in case S’s true belief is creditable to S’s competence. While Lackey’s ( 2007, 2009 ) objection from testimonial knowledge had raised concerns that VE is too strong, some virtue epistemologists (Sosa 2007, Pritchard 2012 ) adopted a weaker condition requiring only partial credit on agent’s part. This paper, however, argues that in addition to the creditable relation, the agent’s competence manifestation could be partial too—in the sense that only part of his/her (...) whole competence regarding the cognitive task is manifested. Interesting consequences follow as we explore this new way of dissecting cognitive agency—in particular, difficult cases for VE arise when one’s cognitive competence is partly apt and partly Gettiered. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of propositional absurdity and investigates its connection to falsity. I propose that instances of absurdity just are cases of what I call maximal abnormality. In light of the works of Smith (2016) and Pietroski and Rey (1995) on normic conditionals which link normality to explanatory demands, I suggest that absurdity also has a close tie with explanations (more precisely, the lacking thereof). Interesting consequences follow under such an account – first, I argue that we should (...) see absurdity as ceteris paribus guide to falsehood – what is absurd is expected to be false, unless further evidence suggests otherwise; second (and relatedly), when further evidence indeed suggests otherwise, absurd propositions would not cease to be absurd. (shrink)

It is usually taken as given that consciousness involves superior or more elaborate forms of information processing. Contemporary models equate consciousness with global processing, system complexity, or depth or stability of computation. This is in stark contrast with the powerful philosophical intuition that being conscious is more than just having the ability to compute. I argue that it is also incompatible with current empirical findings. I present a model that is free from the strong assumption that consciousness predicts superior performance. (...) The model is based on Bayesian decision theory, of which signal detection theory is a special case. It reflects the fact that the capacity for perceptual decisions is fundamentally limited by the presence and amount of noise in the system. To optimize performance, one therefore needs to set decision criteria that are based on the behaviour, i.e. the probability distributions, of the internal signals. One important realization is that the knowledge of how our internal signals behave statistically has to be learned over time. Essentially, we are doing statistics on our own brain. This ‘higherorder’ learning, however, may err, and this impairs our ability to set and maintain optimal criteria for perceptual decisions, which I argue is central to perception consciousness. I outline three possibilities of how conscious perception might be affected by failures of ‘higher-order’ representation. These all imply that one can have a dissociation between consciousness and performance. This model readily explains blindsight and hallucinations in formal terms, and is beginning to receive direct empirical support. I end by discussing some philosophical implications of the model. (shrink)

A record of the words and teachings of Confucius, _The Analects_ is considered the most reliable expression of Confucian thought. However, the original meaning of Confucius's teachings have been filtered and interpreted by the commentaries of Confucianists of later ages, particularly the Neo-Confucianists of the Song dynasty, not altogether without distortion.In this monumental translation by Professor D. C. Lau, an attempt has been made to interpret the sayings as they stand. The corpus of the sayings is taken as an organic (...) whole and the final test of the interpretation rests on the internal consistency it exhibits. In other words, _The Analects_ is read in the light of _The Analects._This results in a truer understanding of Confucius' thought than the traditional interpretation and paves the way for a re-assessment of its importance in the history of Chinese thought and its relevance to the present day world.This volume also contains an introduction to the life and teachings of Confucius, and three appendices on the events in the life of Confucius, on his disciples, and on the composition of _The Analects._. (shrink)

We discuss cases where subjects seem to enjoy conscious experience when the relevant first-order perceptual representations are either missing or too weak to account for the experience. Though these cases are originally considered to be theoretical possibilities that may be problematical for the higher-order view of consciousness, careful considerations of actual empirical examples suggest that this strategy may backfire; these cases may cause more trouble for first-order theories instead. Specifically, these cases suggest that (I) recurrent feedback loops to V1 are (...) most likely not the neural correlate of first-order representations for conscious experience, (II) first-order views seem to have a problem accounting for the phenomenology in these cases, and either (III) a version of the ambitious higher-order approach is superior in that it is the simplest theory that can account for all results at face value, or (IV) a view where phenomenology is jointly determined by both first-order and higher-order states. In our view (III) and (IV) are both live options and the decision between them may ultimately be an empirical question that cannot yet be decided. (shrink)

Measuring event-related potentials (ERPs) has been fundamental to our understanding of how language is encoded in the brain. One particular ERP response, the N400 response, has been especially influential as an index of lexical and semantic processing. However, there remains a lack of consensus on the interpretation of this component. Resolving this issue has important consequences for neural models of language comprehension. Here we show that evidence bearing on where the N400 response is generated provides key insights into what it (...) reflects. A neuroanatomical model of semantic processing is used as a guide to interpret the pattern of activated regions in functional MRI, magnetoencephalography and intracranial recordings that are associated with contextual semantic manipulations that lead to N400 effects. (shrink)

This article compares Habermas’s and Taylor’s approach to the role of religious language in a liberal democracy. It shows that the difference in their approach is not simply in their theories of religious language. The contrast lies deeper, in their incompatible moral theories: Habermas’s universal discourse ethics vs Taylor’s communitarian substantive ethics. I also explore William Rehg’s defence of discourse ethics by conceding that it is based on a metavalue of rational consensus. However, I argue that Habermas’s and Rehg’s discourse (...) ethics and translation proviso are untenable. While Taylor rightly argues that there is no reason to exclude religious reason from the formal political sphere, his proposed fusion of horizons to generate a new hybrid framework is also problematic. I suggest that Taylor’s historical hermeneutics should be extended to include the narrative approach to ethical deliberation as conducive to mutual experiential understanding, and hence to achieving a fusion of horizons of the diverse worlds of citizens in a liberal democracy. (shrink)

This article compares Habermas’s and Taylor’s approach to the role of religious language in a liberal democracy. It shows that the difference in their approach is not simply in their theories of religious language. The contrast lies deeper, in their incompatible moral theories: Habermas’s universal discourse ethics vs Taylor’s communitarian substantive ethics. I also explore William Rehg’s defence of discourse ethics by conceding that it is based on a metavalue of rational consensus. However, I argue that Habermas’s and Rehg’s discourse (...) ethics and translation proviso are untenable. While Taylor rightly argues that there is no reason to exclude religious reason from the formal political sphere, his proposed fusion of horizons to generate a new hybrid framework is also problematic. I suggest that Taylor’s historical hermeneutics should be extended to include the narrative approach to ethical deliberation as conducive to mutual experiential understanding, and hence to achieving a fusion of horizons of the diverse worlds of citizens in a liberal democracy. (shrink)

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In Infotopia, citizens enjoy a wide range of information about the organizations upon which they rely for the satisfaction of their vital interests. The provision of that information is governed by principles of democratic transparency. Democratic transparency both extends and critiques current enthusiasms about transparency. It urges us to conceptualize information politically, as a resource to turn the behavior of large organizations in socially beneficial ways. Transparency efforts have targets, and we should think of those targets as large organizations: public (...) and civic, but especially private and corporate. Democratic transparency consists of four principles. First, information about the operations and actions of large organizations that affect citizens’ interests should be rich, deep, and readily available to the public. Second, the amount of available information should be proportionate to the extent to which those organizations jeopardize citizens’ interests. Third, information should be organized and provided in ways that are accessible to individuals and groups that use that information. Finally, the social, political, and economic structures of society should be organized in ways that allow individuals and groups to take action based on Infotopia’s public disclosures. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is a revolutionary political ideal that requires fundamental changes in political institutions, bases of collective decision making, and the distribution of resources. Perhaps because of its revolutionary character accounts of deliberation in political theory thus far have offered little guidance for actors in actually-existing democratic circumstances. This article develops an ethical account of deliberative democratic action under imperfectly just conditions characterized by material and political inequality and failures of reciprocity. Under such conditions, appropriate principles of action can resolve (...) the tension between deliberation and confrontational political activism. The logic of this account parallels the justification for civil disobedience: the extent of permissible deviationfrom deliberative norms increases according to the adversity of political circumstances. This ethical account is composed of principles of deliberative activism, applications of those principles to four kinds of increasing unfavorable circumstances, and a menu of institutional and political strategies that increase deliberative inclusion and equality. (shrink)

aFunctional Imaging Laboratory, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK bDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, UK cOxford Centre for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Brain, UK dDepartment of Psychiatry and Oxford Centre for Clinical Magnetic Resonance Research, University of Oxford, UK..

It has been over a decade and half since Christof Koch and the late Francis Crick first advocated the now popular NCC project (Crick and Koch, 1990), in which one tries to find the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) for perceptual processes. In his chapter in this book Chris Frith provides a splendid review of how neuroimaging has contributed greatly to this project. For the sake of contrast, this chapter takes a more critical stance on what we have actually learned. (...) Many authors have written on whether looking for the neural correlates would eventually lead to an explanatory theory of consciousness, while the proponents defend that focusing on correlates is a strategically sensible first step, given the complexity of the problem (Crick and Koch, 1998;Crick and Koch, 2003). My point here is not to argue whether studying the NCC is useful, but rather, to question whether we are really studying the NCC at all. I argue that in hoping to sidestep the difficult conceptual issues, we have sometimes also missed the phenomenon of perceptual consciousness itself. (shrink)

This study examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on CSR performance in an emerging economy, China. Because of the need of gaining legitimacy in the new institutional context, Chinese firms have to adopt global CSR practices in order to remain competitive. Using the corporate governance framework, this study examines how board composition, ownership, and TMT composition influence corporate social performance. The propositions are tested using data gathered from 471 firms in China. By and large, empirical findings supported the hypothesized (...) relationships. (shrink)

The question of whether grammaticality is a binary categorical or a gradient property has been the subject of ongoing debate in linguistics and psychology for many years. Linguists have tended to use constructed examples to test speakers’ judgements on specific sorts of constraint violation. We applied machine translation to randomly selected subsets of the British National Corpus (BNC) to generate a large test set which contains well-formed English source sentences, and sentences that exhibit a wide variety of grammatical infelicities. We (...) tested a large number of speakers through (filtered) crowd sourcing, with three distinct modes of classification, one binary and two ordered scales. We found a high degree of correlation in mean judgements for sentences across the three classification tasks. We also did two visual image classification tasks to obtain benchmarks for binary and gradient judgement patterns, respectively. Finally, we did a second crowd source experiment on 100 randomly selected linguistic textbook example sentences. The sentence judgement distributions for individual speakers strongly resemble the gradience benchmark pattern. This evidence suggests that speakers represent grammatical well-formedness as a gradient property. (shrink)

When heterosexuality dominates sexual culture, sexual minorities are marginalised, yielding minority stress and internalised phobia which devastate psychological well-being and raise suicide risks. A growing trend in using mindfulness-related interventions in health care shows positive signs, but there is a paucity of research on mindfulness for sexual minorities. This qualitative research, through interpretative phenomenological analysis, looks into how Buddhist sexual minorities (from various countries) interpret mindfulness from which their increased self-awareness, self-esteem and self-acceptance become prominent intrinsic resources, resulting in enhanced (...) mental health and quality of life. Such an exploratory study extends the horizon of health care benefits for helping professionals and sexual minorities with alternative views in overcoming external and internalised phobia. (shrink)

This study evaluated the dimensionality and psychometric properties of the Brief Self-Control Scale (BSCS) using a sample of university students in mainland China. Nine hundred and three students from a Chinese university participated in this study. The internal consistency, criterion validity, factorial validity and construct validity of the scale were examined. The Chinese versions of the BSCS demonstrated good internal consistency. The BSCS also showed significant moderate correlations with other construct-related scales. Exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis suggested that (...) only a modified 11-item BSCS with a four-factor structure was a good model fit in the sample of Chinese university students. The implications for research and theoretical development are discussed. (shrink)

All along, many commentators stressed the differences of Chinese and Western philosophy and method of Qi, that philosophy and approach to the Western emphasis on analysis, argumentation and logic, and China's philosophical method is longer than intuition, and permits will be realized. Different methods by which they believe will give different results: the knowledge of the outside world through Western methods may be, can be obtained through the French inner truth. The former purpose we got outside, after all is also (...) in the contented. The authors believe that this orthodoxy and popular opinion is a great problem. One problem is: with or without the so-called intrinsic truth, they say, intuitive method of physical certificates but not feasible. In addition to resorting to a very small number of believers of the first-person authority, they can not explain the methods and procedures, they can not prove its effectiveness. In addition, they oppose the West, although on the surface of the speculative method, which emphasizes the importance of reflexivity within the card, but when their faith in order to convince the people off the outer ring of authenticity Wuzhen Dao, in fact, they unwittingly use on the Western speculative methods, but not the logic of Western speculative, but now the speculative. The purpose of this article, first through a thought experiment of the anti-theory, went on to argue that the orthodox view of the popular errors and false. The authors believe that: this say just false, but logically self-denial. (shrink)

In this article, I shall try to argue that some existing interpretations of the Analects cannot provide a satisfactory understanding of the concept of ren, on the one hand, and the relation between ren and li, on the other. Ren is not a thin concept such as right and wrong, good and bad, because it is not a non-substantive concept whose descriptive content has to be identified by a specific criterion which is not included in the concept itself. It is (...) also not or not merely a thick concept such as courage, cruelty, truthfulness, and kindliness. In comparison with a thick concept, ren like courage, but unlike right, has substantive content. Nevertheless, unlike courage and other thick concepts, ren is not only about the ideal quality of a virtuous agent and the moral property of the agent's actions; it is also about the internal capacity of the agent and the principle believed by the agent for making moral actions. Since the meaning of the term is not only related to the external behavior but also related to the internal mind and the relevant principle, here, I call ren a “heavy” concept. It is “heavy” in the sense that it is not a concept of observable or substantive entity, but a theoretical construct which is used to explain the complicated relational property of morality, that is emerged from the internal realm and exhibited in the external realm of an agent. (shrink)

Der Autor analysiert die wichtigsten antiken Metaphertheorien unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihrer philosophischen Prinzipien. Er behandelt im ersten Hauptteil seines Buches die fur die Bildung der spateren Metaphertheorien grundlegenden ontologischen, sprachphilosophischen, begriffs- und urteilslogischen Erkenntnisse vorsokratischer Denker und Platons, im zweiten die Vertiefung, Systematisierung und partielle Modifikation dieser Einsichten durch Aristoteles. Er zeigt weiter, wie Aristoteles wesentliche Elemente dieses Wissens instrumentalisiert, um bestimmte sprachliche Ausdrucksformen als Metaphern zu identifizieren und in ihrer dialektischen Grundstruktur zu erschliessen. Der Interpretation der aristotelischen Metaphertheorie folgt (...) im dritten Hauptteil die Darstellung postaristotelischer Metapherkonzeptionen griechischer und lateinischer Autoren. Die Untersuchungen erhellen den Weg metaphorologischer Begriffs- und Theoriebildung; sie leisten damit einen wissenschaftstheoretischen Beitrag zur Grundlagenforschung in der Literaturwissenschaft.". (shrink)

Not much attention has been paid to Malebranche’s philosophy of time. Scholars who have written on it have typically written about it only in passing, and by and large discuss it only in relation to his philosophy of religion. This is appropriate insofar as Malebranche doesn’t discuss his views of time in isolation from his religious metaphysics. I argue that Malebranche’s conception of how created beings have their properties commits him to saying that God is omnitemporal rather than atemporal. For (...) just as bodies get their spatiality by participating in God’s omnipresence, so all creatures get their temporality by participating in God’s omnitemporality. Moreover, Malebranche is a substantivalist about space and time: infinite space and time are one and the same divinely simple substance, God (partially considered), who contains the world. My exploration of Malebranche’s metaphysics sheds light on his views of eminent containment, participation, and causation. (shrink)

It has been over a decade and half since Christof Koch and the late Francis Crick first advocated the now popular NCC project (Crick and Koch, 1990), in which one tries to find the neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) for perceptual processes. In his chapter in this book Chris Frith provides a splendid review of how neuroimaging has contributed greatly to this project. For the sake of contrast, this chapter takes a more critical stance on what we have actually learned. (...) Many authors have written on whether looking for the neural correlates would eventually lead to an explanatory theory of consciousness, while the proponents defend that focusing on correlates is a strategically sensible first step, given the complexity of the problem (Crick and Koch, 1998;Crick and Koch, 2003). My point here is not to argue whether studying the NCC is useful, but rather, to question whether we are really studying the NCC at all. I argue that in hoping to sidestep the difficult conceptual issues, we have sometimes also missed the phenomenon of perceptual consciousness itself. (shrink)

Traditionally, phenomenal consciousness has been restricted to the realm of perceptual and otherwise sensory experiences. If there is a kind of phenomenology altogether unlike sensory phenomenology, then this was a mistake, and requires an accounting. I argue such cognitive phenomenology exists by appealing to a phenomenal contrast case that relies on meaningful and relatively meaningless dialogue. I explain why previous phenomenal contrast arguments are less likely to be effective on even neutral parties to the debate: these arguments rely on a (...) ‘hard-to understand’ sentence, which may elicit sensory crutches that one focuses on, thereby obscuring cognitive phenomenology. I also argue for a positive characterization of the phenomenal contrast in terms of seeming to be aware of abstract relations that obtain between different contributions in a dialogue. This paves the way for arguing that what it’s like to entertain a cognitive content that p differs from that of q in their cognitive phenomenology. (shrink)

Mencius, who lived in the 4th century B.C., is second only to Confucius in importance in the Confucian tradition. The _Mencius_ consists of sayings of Mencius and conversations he had with his contemporaries. When read side by side with the _Analects_, the _Mencius_ throws a great deal of light on the teachings of ConfuciusMencius developed many of the ideas of Confucius and at the same time discussed problems not touched upon by Confucius. He drew out the implications of Confucius' moral (...) principles and reinterpreted them for the conditions of his time. As the fullest of the four great Confucian texts, the _Mencius_ has been the required reading amongst Chinese scholars for two thousand years, and it still throws considerable light on the character of the Chinese people. (shrink)

Conscious experiences involve subjective qualities, such as colours, sounds, smells and emotions. In this Perspective, we argue that these subjective qualities can be understood in terms of their similarity to other experiences. This account highlights the role of memory in conscious experience, even for simple percepts. How an experience feels depends on implicit memory of the relationships between different perceptual representations within the brain. With more complex experiences such as emotions, explicit memories are also recruited. We draw inspiration from work (...) in machine learning as well as the cognitive neuroscience of learning and decision making to make our case and discuss how the account could be tested in future experiments. The resulting findings might help to reveal the functions of subjective experience and inform current theoretical debates on consciousness. (shrink)

Matti Eklund (2017) has argued that ardent realists face a serious dilemma. Ardent realists believe that there is a mind-independent fact as to which normative concepts we are to use. Eklund claims that the ardent realist cannot explain why this is so without plumping in favor of their own normative concepts or changing the topic. The paper first advances the discussion by clarifying two ways of understanding the question of which normative concepts to choose: a theoretical question about which concepts (...) have the abstract property of being normatively privileged and a further practical question of which concepts we are to choose even granting some concepts are thus privileged. I argue that the ardent realist’s best bet for answering the theoretical question while avoiding Eklund’s dilemma is to provide a real definition of this property. I point out the difficulties for providing such a definition. I then argue that even with an answer to the theoretical question, the ardent realist faces a further dilemma in answering the practical question. In sum, though I see no knock-down argument against ardent realism, it may nonetheless die a death by a thousand cuts. I close by considering a deeper reason for why ardent realism is so difficult to defend: every argument starts somewhere. It is unclear how there can be an Archimedean point that makes no reference to any normative concepts that can nonetheless be employed to convince everyone to adopt ours. I then briefly propose two options for someone still inclined towards realism: (i) accept that our normative concepts are normatively privileged without attempting to explain why this is so, or (ii) be less ardent and accept a perspective-dependent account of normativity. (shrink)